Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

I. Legal Framework

A. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

The ability to enforce any awarded judgment against a defendant is a crucial factor in deciding whether and where to initiate legal action. A judgment that cannot be executed against the defendant's assets is often commercially meaningless. Courts in other states may have enforcement measures available to enforce both domestic and foreign decisions[2]. Only if the court's jurisdiction is deemed adequate for the exercise of judicial power under the private international law (conflict of laws) theory of the location where recognition is sought will a foreign judgment be enforced or recognized[8]. Also, some judgements are incapable of inforcement because of being declaratory. However, if the foreign court's rulings are recognizable, the parties are obligated by them. This implies that the foreign ruling needs to meet the standards set forth by the relevant regime. Additionally, it must be on the merits and between the same parties[4].

Several legal theories support the recognition of foreign judgments. Historically, English courts relied on reciprocity and comity, the latter meaning that foreign rulings deserved respect as a matter of mutual international courtesy. Later, the obligation theory took its place, treating a foreign judgment as imposing a legally binding duty on the judgment debtor—as long as the foreign court properly exercised its jurisdiction[2].This strategy was explained in Adams v. Cape Industries Plc[1], where the English court determined that recognition depends on whether the defendant was present within the foreign court’s territorial jurisdiction or had voluntarily submitted to it.Although the ruling established legal certainty, which is particularly crucial in commercial context, it also brought attention to the limitations of the obligation theory, which still maintains strict jurisdictional bases even though English courts themselves use more flexible guidelines like forum conveniens doctrine (being able to decide whether it is the most appropriate forum to hear the case) and service out of the jurisdiction (serving legal proceedings on someone who is outside of England). Canadian courts, on the other hand, embrace a more contemporary definition of comity. If the foreign court exercised authority in a way that is deemed appropriate by Canadian norms, they will recognize and uphold foreign decisions. This strategy represents a more practical understanding of international legal interaction while balancing justice with international cooperation.

The Brussels I Regulation takes this further in the EU context establishing mutual confidence among Member States as the foundation for recognition and enforcement. It calls for the automatic recognition of judgments with few exclusions, fostering procedural integration, legal clarity, and the efficient operation of the internal market. The Brussels I Regulation governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments within the EU, replacing national rules when applicable[6]. Its objectives are to ease the internal market, foster legal certainty, and uphold mutual confidence among Member States. A ruling from one Member State must be immediately recognized and enforced in another under the Regulation; neither registration nor a declaration of enforceability are required. Enforcement becomes further simpler if a European Enforcement Order (EEO) has been obtained (for example, in uncontested claims); the enforcing state merely needs to show the EEO.

Meaning of Judgment, Recognition, and Enforcement under the Brussels I Regulation

Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) gives a broad definition of “judgment.” It includes not only final judgments but also decrees, orders (including temporary ones), writs of execution, and determination of cost. In contrast to purely contractual settlements, such as those not authorized by a court, judgments by consent are included. The most important prerequisite is that the ruling must be enforceable in the Member State in which it was rendered. Furthermore, the Regulation does not apply to decisions made by private tribunals; only rulings from courts or tribunals of Member States are eligible. Crucially, a defendant must have been given a chance to be heard in order for the judgment to be recognized[3]; default judgments without notice are typically excluded.

A judgment from another Member State is immediately recognized in England after it is issued; it just needs to be pleaded and proven as a fact in proceedings. Any substantive review of the foreign judgment is prohibited by the mutual trust principle. Recognition may only be refused on limited grounds set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Regulation, such as public policy.

Enforcement follows a simplified process. After formal conditions are fulfilled, a declaration of enforceability is sent to the party seeking enforcement, who applies to the English court without prior notice. This declaration allows the judgment creditor to seek protective measures immediately. Following notification, the judgment debtor may file an appeal; however, their defenses are still restricted to those that were permitted in the recognition stage. The Brussels I Regulation, however, does not allow a judgment that comes from a third state and is only recognized in another Member State to be implemented in England; instead, common law principles must be applied.

​In Azerbaijan, recognizing a foreign court's ruling means that the domestic court is prepared to grant rulings of thecompetent foreign judicial or arbitral bodies legal power, including enforcement. Such decisions may arise from civil or commercial disputes, criminal judgments concerning compensation for harm caused by crime, arbitral awards, or other official acts issued by foreign authorities. Recognition and enforcement in Azerbaijan are typically based on the idea of mutual consent — either through bilateral or multilateral treaties to which Azerbaijan is a party, or as provided under domestic legislation. Only when it does not conflict with Azerbaijani law and if there is reciprocity in recognition between the states involved then foreign judgment may be recognized and enforced. The recognition process is initiated by submitting a formal application, which is reviewed and decided upon by the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan.

II. Grounds for Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement

a. Public Policy​

Under the Brussels I Regulation, defences to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are limited and strictly interpreted[9]. Just because a Member State court implemented the Regulation's jurisdictional rules wrongly does not mean that a judgment cannot be recognized[7]. For instance, if a foreign court disregarded an exclusive jurisdiction clause favoring English courts, the English court must still recognise and enforce the judgment without reassessing the jurisdictional issue[2]. Furthermore, even in cases where the law was applied incorrectly or the facts were misinterpreted, the Regulation forbids any review of the foreign judgment's content. Article 34(1), which permits a refusal only in cases where the foreign judgment is obviously against English public policy, contains the primary substantive defense. This requires a clear violation of a fundamental principle of the judicial system. The English court rejected the public policy defense in Apostolides v. Orams, ruling that no fundamental principle of English law had been violated and upholding a Cypriot judgment concerning land in Northern Cyprus. The decision underscores the high threshold required to invoke public policy as a defence under the Regulation.

​A notable case where the public policy exception under Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation was successfully invoked is Krombach v Bamberski. According to French law, he was not allowed to be represented in the civil appeal as he refused to appear in France. Due to the denial of his right to a defense, the defendant contended that the claimant's attempt to enforce the French damages judgment in Germany would be against German public policy[7]. The CJEU held that recognition could be refused if the foreign judgment breached fundamental rights protected by EU Member States, particularly those under the ECHR. Since the proceedings denied the defendant legal representation, the German court was justified in refusing recognition on public policy grounds.

The limited application of the public policy exception under the Brussels I Regulation is further demonstrated by the Gambazzi v. Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc. decision. The claimant in this case attempted to have an English summary decision upheld in Italy. Due to his contempt of court—more especially, his violation of a freezing order—the defendant was prohibited from taking part in the English proceedings. Therefore, until the contempt was purged, he was not allowed to defend the lawsuit. He contended that his right to a fair trial would be infringed upon by enforcement in Italy[5]. The CJEU clarified that although the right of defence can be restricted in exceptional cases, any such limitation must meet “very exacting standards.” If the Italian court found the restriction to be a manifest and disproportionate infringement of the right to be heard, enforcement could be refused on public policy grounds.

b. Natural Justice

Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation provides an important safeguard for the defendant’s right to a fair trial by permitting the refusal of recognition of a judgment delivered in default of appearance, where the defendant was not duly served[5]. In particular, another Member State may refuse to recognize and enforce the foreign decision if the document instituting proceedings was not served in sufficient time or in a proper manner to enable the defendant to prepare a defence. This reflects a broader principle of natural justice and complements Article 26, which ensures that default judgments are not rendered without adequate procedural fairness.

However, the defence under Article 34(2) is narrowly construed. Even in cases where service may have been faulty, the decision is usually regarded as recognizable if the defendant has made some kind of appearance, such as contesting jurisdiction. Although the term “appearance” is given a meaning of its own and does not necessitate formal pleadings, the defendant's right to utilize Article 34(2) is preserved by their simple silence or lack of participation in proceedings. Conversely, if the defendant had an opportunity to contest the judgment in the issuing Member State but failed to do so, the protection under this provision is lost.

c. Irreconcilable with an English Judgment

Article 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation allows refusal of recognition and enforcement of a Member State’s judgment if a Member State's judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier ruling between the same parties in the Member State where enforcement is sought. This demonstrates the Regulation's objective of preventing contradictory rulings, which is backed by Articles 6(1), 27, and 28. Irreconcilability does not require identical facts or legal issues – divergent outcomes from closely related circumstances may suffice[10].

III. Conclusion

All in all, this paper examined the core principles governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments within the framework of the Brussels I Regulation, with a particular focus on the legal position in England. The Regulation offers few and precise grounds for rejection even as it facilitates the easy transfer of rulings among Member States. Fundamental rights are protected by the public policy exception ensuring that judgments which seriously infringe values like the right to a fair trial are not enforced. The natural justice principle safeguards defendants who were not adequately informed or given a reasonable chance to defend themselves. Finally, to maintain uniformity and legal certainty, recognition may be refused in cases where a foreign judgment cannot be reconciled with an existing English ruling.

Bibliography.

1. Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA).

2. Collier J G, Conflict of Laws (Cambridge University Press).

3. Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères (Case C-125/79) [1980] ECR I-1553.

4. DSV Silo- und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH v Owners of the Sennar (The Sennar) (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 (HL).

5. Gambazzi v DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc (Case C-394/07) [2009] ECR I-2563.

6. Götz Leffler v Berlin Chemie AG (Case C-443/03) [2005] ECR I-9611.

7. Krombach v Bamberski (Case C-7/98) [2000] ECR I-1935.

8. Kutner Peter B, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’, 2.

9. Prism Investments BV v Jaap Anne van der Meer (Case C-139/10) [2012] ILPr 13.

10. Roche Nederland BV v Primus (Case C-539/03) [2006] ECR I-2535.